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Supply chain management (SCM) facilitated by the forces of globalization 
and technology evolution was playing an unassailable role in serving the 
world. The impact of Covid-19 caused disruption to these supply chains. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the quasi-potential impact of the 
environment, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on the firms’ 
performance in the transportation and logistics industry and the influence of 
the pandemic.  
The empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of worldwide publicly traded 
companies, shows that the ESG disclosure score (ESGD) especially ESGD 
at higher level significantly contributes to firm value despite a relatively 
lower level of ESGD increases with a drop in firm value at the onset of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. As expected, the results also indicate that the effect of 
ESGD is significantly associated with a positive change in firm value during 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
Fifty-one years later, the article, “The Social Responsibility 
of Business is to Increase its Profits” (Friedman, 1970), is 
still as influential as his Enlightened Shareholder Value 
(ESV) argument for profit maximization.  In the past thirty 
years, corporate stakeholders and governments are in an 
ascending trend to understand and to improve the non-
financial disclosure. Regardless, Friedman’s argument did 
not assume that investors only care about profits and more 
importantly, defend profit maximization as the only way to 
the enterprises’ value creation for the stakeholder when it 
serves the society in the long-run (Edmans, 2020). However, 
it may be the reason why there has been an exponential 
growth in the number of enterprises investing in and 
disclosing environmental impacts (such as carbon emissions, 
energy consumption, paper consumption, etc.), social (such 
as employees, facilities, percentage women in management, 
etc.), and governance (director average age, board size, total 
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CEO compensation, etc.). The evidence confirms the 
momentum that 80 percent of companies of the world 
currently report Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) compared to less than 20 percent of companies had 
disclosed ESG data in the 1990s. Furthermore, by 2020, the 
worldwide growth number of non-financial information 
disclosure of sustainability reporting rate in N100 (5,200 
companies comprised of the top 100 companies by revenue 
each of 52 countries) had increased by 5% in 2017 to 80 
percent in 2020. This can be compared with the leading G250 
(the largest 250 worldwide companies by revenue in the 
ranking of Fortune 500 in 2019) that had more than 90 
percent sustainability reporting rate, but this has varied from 
year to year since 2017 (KPMG, 2020). 
 
The booming attention of ‘sustainability’ has resulted in a 
growing number of firms’ ESG information disclosure. The 
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urgency of business to recognize its purpose and 
responsibility to conduct in a socially responsible manner is 
arguably greater than ever before, Gelles and Yaffe-Bellany 
(2019). Correspondingly, the popularity of establishing the 
relationship studies between ESG and firm performance is 
soaring in response to public interest for information 
transparency (Eccles et al., 2011).  
 
To examine the willingness of non-financial firms to disclose 
corporate social behavior, the data were obtained from 
Bloomberg as ESG Disclosure scores and three sub-scores as 
a reflection of a quantified transparency of a company in 
reporting its CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility).  
  
The outbreak of Covid-19 and the disruption to supply chains 
led to a global impact on economic and significant 
government responses around the world. In recent reports by 
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Dun& Bradstreet, 2020, it found that no less than 16.3% and 
93.8% companies in the Fortune 1000 have one or more 
direct Tier 1 and one or more direct Tier 2 suppliers 
respectively in Wuhan, China. Supply chains thus play an 
essential role as pillars in maintaining the resilience of the 
global economy. 
  
Therefore, albeit the extant study of ESG score and firm 
performance, a key question remains unexplored: Does ESG 
disclosure score prompt value creation, particularly in the 
logistics industry? If it does, then what role did the pandemic 
play in impacting the relationship between ESG disclosure 
and firm performance?  
 
Motivated by the extant studies (Buchanan et al., 2018; Lins 
et al., 2017) and lack of academic literature evidence to 
provide a definitive answer, the pursuit of this research is to 
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use Bloomberg’s comprehensive ESG Disclosure scores and 
a comparably large size sample to shed light on the 
interaction between firm performance and ESG (or CSR) 
Disclosure scores.  
 
Furthermore, the paper examines the potential role of the 
Covid-19 crisis via identifying the time-varying ESG-firm 
performance effect.  
 
Given the large number of studies in the literature that have 
been conducted to find the link between the ESG disclosure 
and firm performance, this paper attempts to contribute new 
outcomes to the existing studies in two key respects. First, in 
prior studies, the impact of ESG disclosure can be 
endogenous to the factors which can result in deviating from 
an unbiased assessment on ESG-firm valuation, i.e., firms 
tend to do good when they are doing well (Hong et al., 2012). 
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Second, the interaction of ESG and firm performance is 
affected by what ESG disclosure information engages: the 
conflict resolution or the over-investment effect (Buchanan et 
al., 2018). In order to overcome these problems to identify 
the factors more accurately, I test the ESG disclosure effect 
around the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak. Inspired by and 
benefiting from a previous study that took the 2008 financial 
crisis as an exogenous shock to companies (Buchanan et al., 
2018), I use the Covid-19 crisis so as to disentangle the 
recursive relationship between ESG activities and firm 
performance. 
 
Following Buchanan et al., 2018 in probing the CSR practice 
effect on firm value by applying a Difference-in-Difference 
(DiD) model, I try to isolate the effect of ESG disclosure 
scores on the changes of firm value. Existing theoretical 
research shows that there may be a positive, negative or non-
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related association between ESG practices and firm 
performance, while the majority of them presents a positive 
link. To align with prior studies, I confirm that the ESG 
disclosure score (ESGD) is beneficial to firm value and more 
statistically significantly positive while ESGD is at a 
relatively higher level. 
 
Finally, this paper provides ramifications to socially 
responsible investments (SRI). The results are suggestive that 
at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the conflict-resolution 
advantages of ESGD dominate the over-investment costs 
with a positive effect of ESG activities on firm value. 
 
With the development backdrop, tendency and purpose of 
this study that have been introduced as above, the 
organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 
provides a literature review on ESG practice and the status 
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quo of other related existing studies. Chapter 3 presents the 
research methodology and the descriptive summary with 
Chapter 4 that discusses the empirical analysis and results. 
Chapter 5 is by way of a conclusion, and Chapter 6 reflects 















Chapter 2 | Literature Review 
2.1 | ESG and Firm Performance 
The explosive growth in perspective of CSR has led to not only 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), but also academic research. 
Many theoretical studies have drawn their attention to the 
relationship between the Environmental, Social, Governance 
(ESG) and the firm performance (FP). The traditional argument of 
profit maximization (Friedman, 1970), as referenced in Chapter 1, 
was challenged with studies of CSR but the results were mixed. 
 
I am defining CSR as actions that appear to further social good 
beyond the interests of the firm and that are required by law 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). In terms of this definition, beyond 
the interests of shareholders, the CSR inter alia influences 
stakeholders. Despite the former studies having provided 
inconsistent results, the effect of ESG (or CSR) on corporate 
financial performance varies with the different extent of influential 
10 
 
ownership and dependency of the economic cycle (Buchanan et al., 
2018).  
 
Friede et al, 2015 showed a majority of cases that had a positive 
impact of ESG on firm performance appeared stable over time. In 
addition, other studies indicate that stronger ESG practices can 
lead to a lower cost of debt and be rewarding in valuation in capital 
markets (Eliwa et al., 2019). Furthermore, the ESG activities were 
found to be advantageous in addressing the internal and external 
corporate governance and censorship mechanisms which were 
associated with the social enhancement within the firm (Jo and 
Harjoto, 2011). 
 
Existing hypotheses that include conflict resolution and reputation-
built have guided researchers to expect a positive interaction of 
ESG (or CSR) on a firm’s financial performance (Freeman, 2020; 
Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Makni et al., 2009). Based on these two 
theories, ESG activities can be tapped into the alleviation of 
11 
 
difference, between stakeholders and the management team. For 
example, ESG actions that are normally embodied in a CSR 
engagement department can often offset the damage resulted by 
the firm (often core business) through the ESG expenses. The 
positive relationship can be explained by the stakeholder theory 
and is reasonable to be expected by investors. 
 
Even though most of the evidence-based research has proven 
a value-enhancing interaction of an ESG effect on firm value, 
it is recognized that ESG per se can on its own lead to a 
decrease in the value of the firm. However, it can benefit 
from the lower cost of debt. For instance, findings in 28 
different countries suggest that one unit increase in a single 
country’s score of sustainability is linked to an average 
decrease in the cost of bank loans (Hoepner et al., 2016). In 
contrast, the ongoing discussions is suggestive of a negative 
relationship between engagement in CSR activities and 
12 
 
corporate financial performance. For example, on the 
contrary, studies document that ESG disclosure can result in 
higher cost to the firm (Yoon et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
other findings also suggest that a negative interaction 
between CSR disclosure and company value due to the 
agency problem and stakeholder protection from managerial 
entrenchment (e.g. Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Cespa & Cestone, 
2007). More specifically, being consistent with prior 
research, a test based on a sample of Canadian firms 
indicated an inverse association between ESG disclosure and 
enterprise financial performance (Richardson & Welker, 
2001). 
 
Empirically, the insignificant link between ESG disclosure 
and firm value also exists (e.g. Qiu et al., 2016). Similarly, a 
study for Canadian firms found no statistical significance in 
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the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and financial performance (Mahoney and Roberts, 2007). 
 
2.2 | Role for Global Supply Chain during Covid-19 
After the introduction of the theory of a schematized nature 
in organizational behavior of distribution management, it 
foresaw the picture of a future that interlocked flow systems 
in an industrial company that had to be interdependent on one 
another (Forrester, 1958). Even though this article is over 
sixty years old, it seemingly has captured the key dynamic 
factors in management that are associated with the 
contemporary development of supply chain management 
(SCM). 
 
The terminology of supply chain management has emerged 
since the past thirty years which is not merely a new word for 
logistics, regardless its definition varies (Cooper et al., 1997). 
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I use the definition of a supply chain as “a set of three or 
more entities (organizations or individuals) directly involved 
in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and/ or information from a source to a customer” 
(Mentzer et al., 2001). 
 
The irreversible force of globalization and technology 
evolution has led to the integration of the world and as a 
result the global supply chains are becoming more vital than 
ever before. Globalization brought ultra-management 
challenges in supply chain management triggering the 
attention from academics and practitioners. Not only a 
domestic problem, supply chain management (SCM) has also 





In the context of the Covid-19 outbreak, supply chain risks 
have severely exposed firms, particularly those in the 
transportation and logistics sector. The coronavirus pandemic 
has impacted the stream from retailers to manufacturers. For 
example, most companies and countries need to keep a 
steady delivery of different kinds of goods, especially 
medical supplies. Working virtually and ‘staying at home’ 
have increased the demand on some sectors such as online 
shopping and the technology industry with the surge in 
digital transactions.  However, with less commuting and 
travel, the price of crude oil faced a drastic decline in 
demand. Henceforth, firms are involved in coping with more 







Chapter 3 | Research Methodology 
3.1 | Research design 
In this paper, I examine the relation of ESG disclosure score and 
firm performance and corporate value’s reaction to before and after 
the threshold of outbreak of Covid-19 in year-end 2020. Compared 
to the prior reviews, there are mainly two obstacles in this 
empirical study.  
 
One is that former studies such as Waddock and Graves in 1997 
that found a recursive relationship between a firm’s societal 
performance and its financial performance. Whereby, the 
endogenous issue of firm performance and ESG disclosure score 
needs to be taken into consideration. Not only the suggestive 
evidence demonstrates that ceteris paribus CSR activities can lead 
to superior financial performance, but also an improved future 




Another one is that the ESG-firm value relationship can be affected 
through two opposite mechanisms with different effects. A firm’s 
financial performance can be strengthened by ESG engagement 
through reconciling the conflicts between managers and 
stakeholders. On the other side, ESG activities can also whittle 
down the company’s financial performance due to over-
investment. Impacted by them, the overall outcome is 
interchangeably determined by which is more dominant (Buchanan 
et al., 2018). 
 
Aiming to tackle the empirical obstacles, I apply the Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) model to examine the discrepancy in a 
company’s financial performance across firms in the same sector 
with different ESG disclosure score in response to time-varying 
effects on the Coronavirus outbreak. Inspired by the previous 
literature, I take advantage of the pandemic caused by Covid-19 to 
elucidate the potential endogeneity from the relationship of ESG 
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disclosure score and firm performance. Uniquely, the global 
economic crisis caused by the outbreak of Covid-19 differs from 
past crises that triggered immense and heterogeneous firm value 
fluctuations. I utilize a unique object of an unpredictable 
exogenous event for the single observation in this paper which is 
beneficial to circumventing the unrelated endogeneity with respect 
to the recursive interaction of ESG and firm performance 
(Meyer,1995; Roberts & Whited, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, my empirical research model is devised to locate 
time-varying effects on ESG-firm value fluctuations. Given that 
performing ESG practices is naturally a cost to the firm value, the 
unexpected outbreak of coronavirus can enlarge these costs. 
 
Eventually, I examine the variations in firm performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q for ESG firms surrounding the Covid-19 crisis, while 




Following the study by Lins et al. (2017) in the 2008 financial 
crisis, I measure the firm’s disclosure in the 2018 concerning that 
firms might adjust their ESG policy and that it could lead to 
differences in ESG disclosure scores in anticipation of cases 
reported of the pandemic that could cause potential risks in the 
future. Besides, in order to examine whether the association 
between the ESG disclosure score and firm performance holds 
when it comes to the period of during the pandemic and post-
pandemic, I define the ‘Crisis’ as a dummy variable that equals one 
in the period of 2020Q1 and 2020Q3 and zero otherwise. ‘Post-
Crisis’ is also denoted as a dummy variable set to one in the period 
of 2020Q4 and 2021Q2 and zero otherwise.  
 
In the regression analysis, to align with the previous studies of 
ESG and firm’s financial performance, Model 4.1 and Model 4.2 
unveil the difference of variations in firm performance during the 
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period of pre-pandemic crisis and pandemic crisis and the period of 
pandemic crisis and post-pandemic crisis. Dummy variables – 
Crisis and Post-Crisis in Model 4.2 would represent the difference. 
Furthermore, I control the time dummy in year and quarter 
respectively. 
 
To ascertain the Difference-in-Difference of ESGD firm 
performance, the key variables are the interaction terms which are 
ESGD * Crisis and ESGD * Post-Crisis in Model 4.2 separately. 
By controlling the other factors that can possibly affect the 
difference in firm performance over time, the objective is to test 
how the ESG disclosure can lead to firm performance through the 
changes around the Covid-19 crisis by far. 
 
3.2 | Sample and Summary statistics 
3.2.1 | Sample construction 
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To construct my sample, I gathered relevant information on firms’ 
ESG disclosure score in 2018 by using the classification of the 
Bloomberg database for publicly traded firms in the transportation 
and logistics sector. 
 
The ESG score is comprised of areas of environment, social, and 
governance. The data on Bloomberg’s ESG score are provided for 
comparable companies reported with over 11,700 companies 
covered in more than 100 countries with over 10 years historical 
records. And the data collected by Bloomberg are from corporate-
sourced filings such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reports, annual reports, official websites, and a proprietary 
Bloomberg survey that makes requests directly from companies’ 
data (Bloomberg, 2020). 
 
Bloomberg designs its proprietary weighting methodology, and 
thus the different company can show a different score and 
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categories. The underlying data from Bloomberg is standardized 
globally by industry-targeted operating data. The industries are 
sorted into a wide range of categories for metrics selection by 
higher, medium, and lower for its environmental impact and by 
higher and lower social impact, particularly pertaining to safety. 
And governance data are updated exclusively for all industries. 
This paper considers ESG score and ESG disclosure score as 
comprehensive measurements, so this industry metrics selection 
would not be an issue.  
 
The ESG disclosure score is different from the ESG score. It 
measures with its three sub-sectors score that quantifies the 
transparency of a company in disclosing its environment, social, 
and governance data that has been disclosed for the latest fiscal 
year. But ESG disclosure score does not quantify the firms’ ESG 
performance and is based on the collected raw data points from 
100 out of 219 (Bloomberg, 2020). The ESG disclosure score is 
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evaluated according to the most common disclosing fields and 
presented as a percentage of total available areas across the ESG 
on Bloomberg. For more details, the overall disclosure score that is 
higher represents a more comprehensive non-financial report. 
Similarly, the weighted disclosure score is normalized from zero 
that firms do not report their ESG data to a hundred that report all 
ESG information. The final disclosure score is accounted for only 
one targeted-industry type.  
 
In this study, I focus on firms in transportation and logistics sector 
under the hierarchy of industrials industry for which all disclosure 
scores are counted based on industrial services. Therefore, the ESG 
disclosure score I use is comparatively applicable throughout 
transportation and logistics (or supply chain) industry. 
 
Apart from the ESG disclosure score, I also obtain the accounting 
data from Bloomberg.  In this paper, a micro-cap supply chain 
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company is defined as the firm that has market capitalization 
below $1 billion as of year-end of 2019. The study removes micro-
cap companies in the transportation and logistics industry because 
these stocks tend to be less liquid to confront the turmoil and face 
higher demand while the market is reflectively awakening to fulfill 
the delivery. Furthermore, I also exclude firms with missing data 
such as lacking necessary ESGD scores and accounting data. 
Unlike the prior studies about financial crisis and outbreak of 
Covid-19 (Lins et al., 2017; Buchanan et al., 2018), I did not 
exclude the financial firms that have suffered from this 
unprecedented epidemic because they could not receive any direct 
financial assistance.  
 
Considering the cases of Covid-19 first informally reported at the 
end of 2019 till in March of 2020 when the World Health 
Organization (WHO) formally declared the outbreak of Covid-19. 
The pandemic crisis is defined as the period from January 2020 to 
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September 2020. In this period, the outbreak of coronavirus has 
been found around the world. This period in the view of this 
research also corresponds to the time that most companies had not 
reacted to the crisis. 
 
Combining all firms with sufficient data coverage on Bloomberg 
database, eventually this paper includes a sample of 258 firms with 
1,557 observations for which all ESG disclosure scores required 
are available in the year-end of 2018. 
 
3.2.2 | Definition of key variables 
As mentioned earlier, the main proxy for firm value is Tobin’s Q 
which is the ratio of the physical assets’ market value of a firm to 
the replacement cost of its assets for each firm calculated as market 
value of assets divided by book value of assets. The emergence of 
Tobin’s Q can be traced back to 1966 (Kaldor, 1966) and was 
popularized ten years after by James Tobin. Tobin’s Q is 
26 
 
considered the nexus between macroeconomics products and 
financial markets and is deemed useful and significant for the 
valuation of a company. The ratio differs from returns based on 
accounting with the underlying hypothesis that a company’s 
market value is equal to the replacement costs of a company’s 
assets in the long-term, i.e., absorbing the future cash flows and 
uncertain risk in the forward-looking perspective. The ratio varies 
from returns based on stock because the ramification of higher 
Tobin’s Q denotes the manager performance contributes greater 
value to the firm from invariable capital.  
 
Following the quarterly accounting constructure (Edmans et al., 
2017), I set the quarterly measurement. Tobin’s Q is computed as 
book value of assets minus book value of equity minus deferred 
taxes, plus market value of equity at end of quarter q before the 
end of 2019 or the last quarter ending in 2019. Then all divided by 
book value of assets at the end of quarter q-1. Tobin’s Q as the 
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dependent variable is unbiased from estimation errors in terms of 
econometric theory.  
 
Enlightened by the previous studies involving the determinants of 
Tobin’s Q (Buchanan et al., 2018; Servaes & Tamayo, 2013; 
Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; Laeven & Levine, 2008), I control the 
relevant variables for a firm’s financial performance in the year 
before the outbreak of Covid-19. The control variables include 
firm size, sales growth, capital expenditures, fixed assets to book 
assets, cash holdings, leverage, R&D intensity, profitability. All 
accounting data are derived from the quarter q that is the end 
quarter before the end of 2019 or the last quarter ending in 2019. 
Market capitalization is in millions of US dollars. Book assets are 
valued at the end of quarter q.  
 
Firm size, denoted as LNBA, is measured as the natural log of 
book assets at the end of quarter q. Sales Growth Rate, denoted as 
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SGR, is captured as the sales in quarter q over the sales in quarter 
q-4 minus one. Capital expenditures/ book assets, denoted as 
CAPEX/BA, is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures 
changing from the previous quarter to q divided by the total assets 
in the end of prior quarter q-1. Fixed assets/ book assets, shown as 
FA/BA, is calculated as the book value of property, plant, and 
equipment at the end of quarter q over the book value of total 
assets at the end of quarter q. Leverage, denoted as LEV, is the 
ratio of total debts over total assets, both measured at the end of 
quarter q. Cash, shown as CASH, is computed as cash plus short-
term investments at the end of quarter q over the total assets at the 
end of quarter q. R&D Intensity, denoted as RDI, is measured by 
the research and development expense at current quarter q divided 
by total assets at the end of quarter q-1 and is set to zero when 
research and development expense is unobservable. Profitability, 
shown as PROFITABILITY, is measured as the ratio of net 
income through the quarter q over the total assets at quarter q. An 




3.2.3 | Descriptive statistics 
The companies in the sample need to fulfil the requirements: First, 
a company chosen as participating in a supply chain is publicly 
listed and included in company classification of transportation and 
logistics in the Bloomberg dataset. Second, the company sample 
excludes the micro-firm for which in this paper it is defined as 
explained earlier as the firm with market capitalization less than 
one billion US dollars as of the last quarter of year 2019. Last, 
chosen firms are required to have sufficient data coverage from 
accounting statements uncovered in indicated quarters and 
overview non-financial ESG disclosure score data in the 2018. 
After the fulfillment of the requirements above, a sample of 1,557 







Table 3.1 provides the summary description of major variables 
described earlier. In the first row of Table 3.1, the main variable of 
interest in this paper, ESGD, is significantly positive with a mean 
value of 32.561, a standard deviation value of 13.542, 25th 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25th perc. Median 
ESGD 32.561 13.542 21.070 30.990 
Tobin’s Q 1.406 0.805 0.922 1.113 
LNBA 8.959 1.201 8.093 8.788 
SGR 0.0008 0.438 -0.186 -0.012 
CAPEX/BA 0.0002 0.0115 -0.0032 0.0001 
FA/BA 0.439 0.251 0.228 0.458 
LEV 0.340 0.181 0.230 0.330 
CASH 0.130 0.093 0.059 0.110 
RDI 0.001 0.0034 0 0 
PROFITABILITY 0.007 0.0185 0.0004 0.0067 
Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Variables 75th perc. Min Max 
ESGD 43.390 9.500 65.290 
Tobin’s Q 1.575 0.314 4.589 
LNBA 9.706 6.680 12.157 
SGR 0.129 -0.864 2.351 
CAPEX/BA 0.0037 -0.043 0.040 
FA/BA 0.642 0.002 0.9226 
LEV 0.461 0 0.8281 
CASH 0.181 0.002 0.465 
RDI 0.0002 0 0.025 
PROFITABILITY 0.0148 -0.056 0.075 
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percentile value of 21.07, a median value of 30.99, and 75th 
percentile value of 43.39. The result shows the average and median 
level of ESGD (Environmental, Social, and Governance 
Disclosure) score of ESGD firms with 9.5 minimum score and 
65.29 maximum score as supply chain providers on the onset of the 
outbreak of the epidemic at the end of or close to the end of year 
2019. The second row indicates that Tobin’s Q is mostly greater 
than zero, with a mean value of 1.406, a standard deviation value 
of 0.805, 25th percentile value of 0.922, a median value of 1.113, 
and 75th percentile value of 1.575 demonstrating the ramification 
of both of shareholders and stakeholders of the firms were more 
likely to be confident about the persistence of services offered by 
supply chain provider firms that as a part of their portfolios, its 
workers, or involved in business engagements confronting 







The definitions of overall variables are shown as above and other 
company characteristics computed as control variables in the 
model are as shown in Table 3.1 as well.  The correlation matrix of 
all variables employed in the model is presented in Table 3.2. 
Values of Tobin’s Q and other control variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix 
 ESGD Tobin’s 
Q 
LNBA SGR CAPEX/BA 
Tobin’s Q 0.01     
LNBA 0.41 -0.24    
SGR -0.10 0.05 -0.02   
CAPEX/BA -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03  
FA/BA 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.01 
LEV 0.21 -0.19 0.21 -0.11 0.0002 
CASH -0.01 0.16 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 
RDI 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.05 -0.01 
PROFITABILITY -0.08 0.31 -0.16 0.38 -0.08 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 FA/BA LEV CASH RDI 
LEV 0.19    
CASH -0.31 -0.22   
RDI -0.13 -0.15 0.05  
PROFITABILITY -0.05 -0.35 0.04 0.12 
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Chapter 4 | Pandemic-Period Firm Performance 
4.1 | Baseline Results 
I estimate the regression model of firm performance prior to the 
onset of the crisis period as an association with firms’ pre-
pandemic ESG disclosure ratings and an amount of control 
variables. The model shows in Equation 4.1 as: 
Tobin’s 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖,2018 + 𝛼2′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + Time Fixed Effect + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
…………………………………………………….................4.1 
where the dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, is at quarter q ending at 
or closing to the last quarter of year 2019 measured as the ratio of 
assets in book value, minus equity in book value, minus deferred 
tax liabilities plus equity in market value at the quarter q and all 
divided by the assets in book value at the previous quarter q-1. The 
main explanatory variable of interest, 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖,2018, is the model’s 
proxy sourced from Bloomberg proprietary model formed as an 
overview of environmental, social, governance disclosure score in 
the year 2018. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of control variables. More detailed 
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of control variables of firm’s characteristics are also displayed in 
Table 3.1 and Appendix A. Standard errors of heteroskedasticity 
consistence are noted in parentheses. Specifically, ***, **, and * 
mark that the parameter estimation significantly differs from zero 
at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
I control the year fixed effect in Column (1) in Table 4.1 that 
shows that firms with higher ESG disclosure score ratings perform 
significantly greater than those with lower ESGD firms. The effect 
of ESG disclosure score on firm performance is economically 
impactful: a one-standard-deviation increase in ESGD (13.542) is 
associated with a 9.57 (13.542* 0.00707* 100%) percentage point 
(13.542* 0.00707* 100%) increase in the value of Tobin’s Q. 
 
Nevertheless, specifications presented in Column (1) of Table 4.1 
have a concern that a strong performance of higher ESG disclosure 
score firms can be a fallacy that existing omitted variables are 
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correlated with ESGD, instead of ESG disclosure itself. To 
eliminate this possibility, under the assurance of healthy financial 
performance, I employ several proxies that are proven to affect the 
value of Tobin’s Q in prior studies as company’s characteristics. I 
calculate the firm’s financial health and characteristics as the end 
of year 2019, or as close as to firms that lack of disclosure of the 
fiscal year end before the onset of the pandemic outbreak. 
 
To confirm that higher ESG disclosure score firms do have a better 
performance than those with a lower score at the onset of the 
Covid-19 outbreak, the results in Column (2) of Table 4.1 that 
control time fixed effect as quarterly indicate that the 
outperformance from higher ESGD firms does not attenuate but 
strengthens when the additional variables are included. More 
importantly, the effect remains financially positive. For instance, in 
Column (2), a one-standard-deviation increase in ESGD (13.542) 
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is associated with a 9.34 (13.542* 0.0069* 100%) percentage point 
increase in firm performance before the onset of the crisis.  
 
When it comes to the control variables, based on the Model 4.1 in 
Column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in firm size (1.201), 
sales growth rate (0.438), capital expenditures to book assets 
(0.0115), and fixed assets to book assets (0.251) is in association 
with a variation of firm performance of -19.22 (1.201* (-0.16)* 
100%), -38.50 (0.438* (-0.879)* 100%), -1.01 (0.0115* (-0.879)* 
100%), and 7.91 (0.251* 0.315* 100%) percentage points, 
respectively. Moreover, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
leverage 0.181, cash 0.093, R&D intensity 0.0034, and profitability 
0.0185 results in a change of firm performance of -2.66 (0.181* (-
0.147)* 100%), 12.62 (0.093* 1.357* 100%), 14.96 





Table 4.1: ESGD Score: Yearly and Quarterly Performance  




ESGD 0.00707*** 0.00690*** 
 (0.00160) (0.00160) 
LNBA -0.160*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0200) 
SGR -0.119** -0.136*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0510) 
CAPEX/BA -0.879 0.165 
 (1.462) (1.478) 
FA/BA 0.315*** 0.308*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0765) 
LEV -0.147 -0.139 
 (0.127) (0.126) 
CASH 1.357*** 1.339*** 
 (0.230) (0.231) 
RDI 43.99*** 43.61*** 
 (7.311) (7.392) 
PROFITABILITY 11.49*** 11.63*** 
 (1.492) (1.503) 
2020-Q1  -0.217*** 
  (0.0585) 
2020-Q2  -0.146** 
  (0.0615) 
2020-Q3  -0.0881 
  (0.0638) 
2020-Q4  -0.0324 
  (0.0669) 
2021-Q1  -0.00744 
  (0.0674) 
2021-Q2  0.172 
  (0.149) 
Year 2020 -0.117**  
 (0.0500)  
Year 2021 0.0270  
 (0.0671)  
Constant 2.298*** 2.316*** 




As a result, the financial impact of ESGD ratings on logistics’ firm 
performance during the pandemic is greater than three-fifths of the 
impact of cash holdings, but slightly less than half of the impact of 
profitability delineating that corporate social responsibility 
disclosure score is a potential aspect of explaining the entire firm 
performance in the pandemic period. 
 
In Table 4.2, by separately controlling time fixed effects sorted by 
yearly and quarterly, I re-examine the prior model, but in lieu of 
directly taking the ESGD score as my proxy for explanatory, I split 
the firms into ESG disclosure score quartiles and conclude three 
dummies for quartile proxy from 2 to 4 where the intercept denotes 
the effect of the first quartile. By adopting this approach, the 
analysis can be applied to examining whether the effect of a firm’s 
non-financial disclosure policy on firm performance is more 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,557 1,557 
R-squared 0.219 0.225 
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pronounced at a very high or very low part in the quartile of ESG 
disclosure. The result in Column (1) while controlling the year for 
fixed effect shows the variation in firm performance through the 
whole industry from the best to the worst ESG disclosure score 
quartile. This is captured by the coefficient on ESGD4 - 16.6 
percentage points.  
 
For firm performance in quarterly time fixed effect, the variation is 
slightly less at 16.2 percentage points. This result again indicates 
that companies with higher ESG disclosure ratings had the best 
pandemic crisis period financial performance than those with lower 
ratings. Whereas, from the worst to the medium, differences in 
firm financial performance are at least slightly negative in both of 
yearly and quarterly time fixed effects.  
 
Featured by the entire set of control variables, in Columns (1) and 
(2) in Table 4.2, Tobin’s Qs add up to about minus 15.7 percentage 
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points and minus 15.4 percentage points from the lowest level to 
the second lowest level of ESGD quartile as ESGD2, respectively. 
The downside effect of ESGD on firm financial performance 
attenuates 6.97 percentage points (((-0.0873)- (-0.157))* 100%) 
and 6.37 percentage points (((-0.0903)- (-0.154))* 100%) till 
minus 8.73 percentage points and minus 9.03 percentage points 
while accruing from the second lowest ESGD quartile of ESGD2 
to the third ESGD quartile of ESGD3.  
 
Turning to firmly strengthening the financial performance from the 
third ESGD quartile of ESGD3 to the fourth ESGD quartile of 
ESGD4, the improvement yields a more conspicuous performance 
for a value enhancement of 25.33 percentage points (((0.166- (-
0.0873))* 100%) and 25.23 percentage points ((0.162- (-0.0903))* 




Consequently, my findings are that the ESG disclosure score has a 
significantly positive impact on the firm value with greater rating 
and can destroy the company’s performance while situating in a 
lower ESGD quartile with lower rating as well. This suggests that 
during the crisis period, shareholders were majorly pessimistic 
when a firm in the supply chain had an inadequate corporate social 
responsibility disclosure rating and most reassured optimistically 
when the firm’s ESG disclosure score is in high-grade. Apparently, 
before splitting, the collective benefit of investing in ESG activities 
outweigh the cost of its engagement. In contrast, in the relative 
lower quartile of ESGD2 and ESGD3, it is much costly for a firm 
with both of a deteriorating performance and negative coefficients 
to implement ESG practices compared with a firm with both of a 
value-enhancement and a positive coefficient in ESGD4. 
 
For control variables in the model, firm performance has 
significantly positive associations with cash holdings, research and 
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development intensity, and profitability, but significantly negative 
associations with firm size and sales growth rate. 
 
Table 4.2: Dummies for Quartiles of ESGD Score: Yearly and 
Quarterly Performance 




   
ESGD2 -0.157*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0552) 
ESGD3 -0.0873 -0.0903 
 (0.0590) (0.0592) 
ESGD4 0.166*** 0.162** 
 (0.0641) (0.0637) 
LNBA -0.158*** -0.159*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) 
SGR -0.119** -0.136*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0513) 
CAPEX/BA -0.967 0.0710 
 (1.457) (1.472) 
FA/BA 0.251*** 0.245*** 
 (0.0770) (0.0767) 
LEV -0.0951 -0.0880 
 (0.129) (0.128) 
CASH 1.318*** 1.300*** 
 (0.231) (0.232) 
RDI 46.74*** 46.35*** 
 (7.428) (7.499) 
PROFITABILITY 11.29*** 11.43*** 
 (1.465) (1.474) 
2020-Q1  -0.217*** 
  (0.0588) 
2020-Q2  -0.146** 
  (0.0614) 
2020-Q3  -0.0892 
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  (0.0637) 
2020-Q4  -0.0337 
  (0.0665) 
2021-Q1  -0.00918 
  (0.0672) 
2021-Q2  0.164 
  (0.145) 
Year 2020 -0.117**  
 (0.0500)  
Year 2021 0.0240  
 (0.0667)  
Constant 2.543*** 2.556*** 
 (0.173) (0.172) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,557 1,557 
R-squared 0.228 0.234 
 
4.2 | Comparing Firm Performance Inside and Outside of the 
Pandemic Period 
By far, the evidence above has pointed out that ESGD score has a 
positive influence on the firm performance before the onset of the 
pandemic of Covid-19 i.e., the ESGD score can fortify the firm 
performance during the overall periods. In this section, I test if this 
positive relationship is exclusive to periods of the outbreak of the 
Covid-19 and the post-crisis when the world started to be reflective 
to the epidemic that might be attributed to other unobservable 
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factors correlated to the ESGD score which is omitted in the 
model. 
 
To address this concern, I apply a difference-in-difference (DID) 
regression of measurement of Tobin’s Q on ESGD score with two 
interactions of two time-dummy variables including crisis period 
and post-crisis period and other control variables. To be more 
specific, I build a panel of quarterly firm performance measured by 
a proxy of Tobin’s Q for the entire group of firms in the sample 
from the first quarter in 2020, prior to the declaration of pandemic 
crisis, to the second quarter in 2021, several months into the 
adequate time for the reflective recovery. Taking the panel, I 
estimate the model as follows:  
Tobin’s 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖,2018 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖,2018 ∗ Post-𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 




where Tobin’s 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is accordingly the quarterly value as the 
measurement of corporate performance. 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑖,2018 is my proxy 
for ESG disclosure score at the year-end of 2018. 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a 
dummy variable that is set to one if the time period is between the 
first quarter in 2020 (2020-Q1) and the third quarter in 2020 
(2020-Q3) and equals zero otherwise. Post-𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 is another 
dummy variable that is set to one if the time period is between the 
fourth quarter in 2020 (2020-Q4) and the second quarter in 2021 
(Q2-2021) and equals zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is the vector of control 
variables as consistent with Model 4.1. I take the ESG disclosure 
score at the year-end of 2018 outside the pandemic period in order 
to circumvent the potential change that firms could possibly have 
adjustments of their environmental, social, governance strategies 
and disclosure policies that can lead to differences in the score of 
ESGD in anticipation of the unprecedented pandemic. ***, **, and 
* indicate that the parameter estimation significantly differs from 




As in Model 4.1, time dummy variables are specified at yearly and 
quarterly levels and firms as before, with market values below $1 
billion as of year-end of 2019 are excluded from the analysis. In 
Model 4.2, the coefficient on the interaction between 2018 ESG 
disclosure score and the crisis (𝛽1) captures the differentiated 
impact of ESGD on quarterly and yearly financial performance 
during the three quarters from the first quarter of year 2020 to the 
third quarter of year 2020 controlling time-series in quarterly and 
yearly performance. 
 
The yearly and quarterly results are both presented in Table 4.3. 
More importantly, specifications in Columns (1) and (2) indicate 
that high-ESGD firms have an excellent performance under the 
crisis period. To be more precise, according to the financial 
significance, the coefficient of 0.00519 on the ESGD * Crisis 
interaction delineates that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
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2018 ESGD (13.542) is associated with a 703-baisis-point 
(0.00519* 13.542* 100%) greater firm performance during the 
pandemic period on a yearly basis. During the identical period, in 
terms of the financial significance, the coefficient of 0.00594 on 
the ESGD * Crisis interaction indicates that a one-standard-
deviation increase in 2018 ESGD (13.542) is similarly associated 
with an 804-basis-point (0.00594* 13.542* 100%) higher 
performance on a quarterly basis. After the pandemic crisis with 
vigilant reflections, the relationship between ESGD and corporate 
performance remains statistically significant.  
 
Quantitatively, the coefficient of 0.00814 on the ESGD * Post-
Crisis interaction indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase 
in 2018 ESGD (13.542) is associated with a 1102-basis-point 
(0.00814* 13.542 * 100%) greater performance after the pandemic 
crisis on a yearly basis. During the same period, the coefficient of 
0.00663 on the ESGD * Post-Crisis interaction indicates that a 
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one-standard-deviation increase in 2018 ESGD (13.542) is 
associated with an 898-basis-point (0.00663* 13.542* 100%) 
higher performance on a quarterly basis.  
 
These outcomes have proven that the greater firm’s financial 
performance earned by high-ESGD firms are attributed not only to 
the unexpected event, but also the progress after the world supply 
chain had accommodated and was being reflective. Such evidence 
of firm performance in the post-pandemic world presents that the 
high-ESGD corporates keep benefiting from the ESG disclosure 
while engaging in the CSR under the confrontation to the chronic 
pandemic. The market recovery remains uncertain because new 
variants of Covid-19 keep developing such as Delta, that implies 
the level from the status quo to the fully adjusted post-pandemic 




The unpredictability of this event could disrupt the global 
economy. However, when the solutions such as different kinds of 
vaccinations are brought to the surface, prices overall would be 
adjusted to a new rebalanced level. That is to say that any 
benefiting ESG action of delivering the trust and sustainability to 
the investors would keep being reflected into the firm performance 
throughout the periods. In details reported in Table 4.3, the ESGD 
score is held constant as of the year-end 2018 aiming at justifying 
whether the measurement of ESG disclosure score has an impact 
on firm performance during and after the pandemic. 
 
Simultaneously, I also try to control the firm fixed effect to avoid 
those time-invariant omitted factors, and thus ESGD itself can be 
also taken in by a firm’s factors where all the standard errors are 
clustered by firm level. Undesirably, the relationship of 
interactions proves to be insignificant, even though the control 




The signs of coefficients for control variables remain exhaustively 
consistent with the change value of Tobin’s Q in the previous 
analysis of Model 4.1 when the values have slight differences. 
 
Table 4.3: Overview of ESG Disclosure Score 




   
ESGD * Crisis 0.00519*** 0.00594*** 
 (0.00175) (0.00194) 
ESGD * Post-Crisis 0.00814*** 0.00663** 
 (0.00201) (0.00275) 
LNBA -0.154*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) 
SGR -0.129*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0510) 
CAPEX/BA -0.429 0.124 
 (1.452) (1.474) 
FA/BA 0.311*** 0.307*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0768) 
LEV -0.134 -0.123 
 (0.127) (0.127) 
CASH 1.349*** 1.342*** 
 (0.232) (0.232) 
RDI 44.05*** 43.80*** 
 (7.345) (7.385) 
PROFITABILITY 11.59*** 11.74*** 
 (1.494) (1.508) 
2020-Q1  -0.409*** 
  (0.0872) 
2020-Q2  -0.339*** 
51 
 
  (0.0913) 
2020-Q3  -0.281*** 
  (0.0913) 
2020-Q4  -0.248** 
  (0.114) 
2021-Q1  -0.222** 
  (0.111) 
2021-Q2  -0.0401 
  (0.185) 
Year 2020 -0.310***  
 (0.0764)  
Year 2021 -0.239**  
 (0.0937)  
Constant 2.465*** 2.467*** 
 (0.186) (0.186) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,557 1,557 













Chapter 5 | Conclusions and Social implications 
The result of a positive effect of ESG activities on firm value has 
proven that at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the conflict-
resolution advantages of ESGD dominate the over-investment 
costs. First, before the onset of the pandemic, the ESGD 
significantly contributed to firm value. Second, in ESGD quartiles, 
the ESGD at the lower-level quartile suggests that both the second 
and the third quartiles in the ESGD have negative effects on the 
firm value, while the third level quartile of ESGD has a slightly 
negative effect on firm value, despite being statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, the ESGD in the fourth quartile implies 
that the higher-level quartile of ESGD performs a superior effect 
on enhancing firm value.  
 
Third, the results have shown that the effects of ESGD on the 
value change are all significantly associated with positive 
influences during the pandemic and post-pandemic period. In sum, 
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the interests of conflict-resolution in ESG disclosure outweigh the 
cost concern of over-investment in ESG activities overall. More 
accurately, the high ESGD firms outperform the low ESGD firms 
by at least a 25.23 percentage points improvement. The positive 
effect of ESGD also persists throughout the period.  
 
In addition, I interpret the social outcomes as follows. First, driven 
by sustainable development in the world economy, the service 
delivered by the supply chain management firms with higher 
ESGD should be profitable and desirable in the long-run as the 
relation shows a value-creation to the firm performance as 
designed in present. Second, my results suggest that during the 
unique pandemic in the world it is worth investing in firm’s ESG 
practices to increase the firm value. Though in the short-term the 
relatively lower ESGD firms might see value eroded while 




To conclude, the role of sustainability to the business world is as 
important as to confronting the chronically uncertain Covid-19 
epidemic. Pay-offs of investing in ESG practices are desirable in 
increasing the firm value, while mitigating the concern of 















Chapter 6 | Limitations and Suggestions for future research 
Firstly, potential improvements in this paper can be traced to the 
fact that Covid-19 that is a recent occurrence given its emergence 
in the early 2020. As a result, I can only examine the short-term 
impacts. At the fourth wave with the Delta variant and other 
potential mutations, further research can examine a longer Covid-
19 horizon.  
 
Second, the interest of this research concentrates on the important 
role of the transportation and logistics industry given that the much 
higher demand for products and that the number of people being 
forced to work from home. As a result, the number and diversity of 
observations can be widened and enlarged. Simultaneously, a 
broader sample might generate differential outcomes when 




Third, as in this paper I assess the mechanism of how ESG 
disclosure affects firm value treating the surrounding onset of 
Covid-19 as an exogenous shock to the supply chain industry in 
order to examine the relationship between ESG disclosure and firm 
performance by applying difference-in-difference (DiD) model. 
 
Caveats exist. The omitted time-serious heterogeneity in firms 
might give reasons to my findings, however, the results remain 
convincing under the inclusion of a prior suggestion of an 
association between ESG practice and firm value and a battery of 
control variables. Furthermore, the link is constructed using the 
previous academic literature and the proxy is proprietary models of 
the specific dataset provider. Other channels might also affect the 
firm value and other providers can have differential measurements. 
In further research, to estimate other channels of explaining the 




Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
ESGD An indicator of ESG disclosure score that is 
proprietarily computed by Bloomberg reported 
in the end of year 2018. 
Crisis 
 
A dummy variable set to one in the period of the first 




A dummy variable set to one in the period of the last 
quarter in 2020 to the second quarter in 2021 and 
equals zero otherwise. 
Tobin’s Q 
 
The ratio is computed as book value of assets minus 
book value of equity, minus deferred taxes, plus 
market value of equity at end of quarter q before the 
end of 2019 or the last quarter ending in 2019, and 




The value of book assets at the end of quarter q. 
Firm size 
 
The natural log of book assets. 
Sales Growth Rate 
 
The percentage change in current quarter q sales 




The ratio of capital expenditures from q-1 to q divided 
by the total assets in the end of prior quarter q-1. 
Fixed assets/ book 
assets 
 
The book value of property, plant, and equipment at 
the end of quarter q over the book value of total assets 
at the end of quarter q. 
Leverage 
 
The ratio of total debts over total assets both measured 





Cash plus short-term investments at the end of quarter 
q over the total assets at the end of quarter q. 
R&D Intensity  
 
Research and development expense divided by total 
assets at the end of quarter q-1 and is set to zero when 




The ratio of net income through the quarter q over the 
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